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Erich Fromm once said “the quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning. Uncertainty is 
the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers.” For some, this quote is unmistakably 
true, impelling them to great discoveries of nature and the mind. For others, uncertainty is 
the very essence of confusion and ambiguity, offering nothing more than reason to retreat to 
more predictable and certain times. In this chapter, we explore the theory of uncertainty 
orientation as related to cognition and cognitive processes, including research that was 
conducted in Canada, Japan, and China. First, we discuss the characteristic uncertainty self-
regulation styles that distinguish uncertainty-oriented individuals from certainty-oriented 
individuals. Next, we discuss the uncertainty orientation framework which integrates one’s 
uncertainty self-regulation style, the uncertainty present in the situation, and one’s 
characteristic motivations (e.g., achievement motivations) to predict performance outcomes 
in the related motivation domain. After discussing these basic tenants of our framework, we 
examine some of the cross-cultural research that has directly tested the predictions of the 
theory of uncertainty orientation. Concluding, we contrast our conceptualization of culture 
with how culture is commonly conceived in cross-cultural research.  
 
Consider the following scenario: “A high school student is confronted with a major life decision, 
one that has innumerable consequences for the future. It is the spring and near the end of the 
final year of her high school career. This student has achieved good grades in school and many 
universities have offered major scholarships to attend their school. Some of these offers are 
from universities out of the country and in places where she has never traveled to or know much 
about, essentially, in places that are new, unknown, and non-established for the student. 
Alternatively, she has a very stable and happy life in the small town where she was brought up 
in. Her parents own a very successful restaurant in town, where she enjoys serving the 
customers and taking care of the everyday details involved in running a restaurant. Eventually, 
her parents will let her take over the restaurant if she would like to. What should she do? Should 
she venture into the unknown and attend university in a place she has not been or know anyone? 
Or should she stay in with what is known and work in the family restaurant, someday becoming 
the owner of it?”  
 
Differential cognitive processes in uncertainty-oriented and certainty-oriented individuals 
We propose that what this student decides to do is dependent on the individual difference 
variable called uncertainty orientation. Uncertainty orientation is a self-regulatory style that 
focuses on how one approaches and handles uncertainty (Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; Sorrentino 
& Short, 1986; Sorrentino, Smithson, Hodson, Roney, & Walker, 2003). Uncertainty, within 
our conceptualization, is neither aversive, nor inherently positive. Rather, uncertainty is viewed 
as a cognitive variable, specifically informational rather than affective (Sorrentino & Roney, 
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2000; Raynor & McFarlin, 1986). Individuals exist on a bipolar continuum, from those who are 
uncertainty-oriented (UO) to those who are certainty-oriented (CO). UOs approach uncertainty 
and uncertain situations in an attempt to resolve it in a direct and effortful manner. They are 
especially engaged by new information about the self and environment and the prospects of 
learning from such situations (e.g., Roney & Sorrentino, 1995; Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984). 
Conversely, COs do not approach uncertainty, opting for the maintenance of certainty and 
clarity by resorting to what they already know about themselves and their environment, or 
relying on heuristics (e.g., Hodson & Sorrentino, 1997, 2001; Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984).1 
Therefore, UOs and COs characteristic uncertainty regulations styles lead them to have 
different cognitions and divergent cognitive processes.   
  
Uncertainty orientation and self-relevant cognitions. In the seminal study on uncertainty 
orientation, Sorrentino and Hewitt (1984) investigated the different approaches that UOs and 
COs take when given the opportunity to seek self-knowledge. First, participants were given a 
new test that could distinguish between people, low, moderate, or high on a novel mental ability. 
Then, participants were given false feedback on the test, being told they were either not in the 
low range (i.e., either high or moderate) or not in the high range (i.e., either moderate or low) on 
this mental ability. Participants were given an opportunity to help construct a second test that 
can further discriminated their ability by selecting items to go into this new test. Three types of 
items were available to be chosen. The first type of items was ascending items that could 
discriminate between someone moderate or high on this mental ability. The second type of 
items was descending items that could distinguish between those low or moderate on this 
mental ability. The last type was a constant type, which is neither indicative of low nor high 
mental ability. In general, UOs chose items on the second test that would further discriminate 
their ability. Specifically, UOs given feedback that they were either moderate or high on this 
mental ability chose, on the second test, items that discriminated between moderate and high 
ability. Analogously, UOs told they were either low or moderate in ability, chose items that 
discriminated between low and moderate ability. However, COs, tended to choose items that 
were not diagnostic of their abilities. Therefore, COs that were given feedback as to being either 
moderate or high in ability chose items that discriminated between low and moderate ability, 
while they told they were either low or moderate in ability chose items that discriminated 
between moderate and high ability. Moreover, both UOs and COs chose their preferred items 
types regardless of positive (i.e., moderate or high ability feedback condition) or negative 
outcome (i.e., low or moderate ability feedback condition).   
A recent study, conducted by Haynes, Olson, Sorrentino, Szeto, Wirkki, and O’Connor 
(2007), further accentuates the differences that UOs and COs manifest for cognitions about the 
self. Specifically, these authors tested to see if one’s uncertainty orientation would have an 
effect on the generation of counterfactual thoughts after positive and negative events. 
Counterfactuals are thoughts about how events might have turned out differently, and are 
generated as a way to prepare for the future (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Roese, 1994, 1997; 
Roese & Olson, 1995). Moreover, this type of cognitions comes in two forms: an upward and a 
downward type. Upward counterfactuals are thoughts of how things could have turned out 
better (e.g., “only if I studied more, I would have aced the test”). Whereas, downward 
counterfactuals are thoughts about how things could have turned out worse (e.g., “if I hadn’t 
crammed last night, I would have received a lower mark”). Nasco and Marsh (1999) have 
demonstrated that upward counterfactuals are especially useful in serving a preparatory function, 
                                                
1 Our measure of individual differences in uncertainty orientation might appear on the surface to be similar 
to other variables such as novelty seeking. However, uncertainty orientation is informational, dealing with 
resolving uncertainty by different ways of handling it. Novelty seeking is a variable that is affective, 
dealing with preference for specific situations and emotional responses (e.g., anger and frustration) to 
stimuli (e.g., Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993).   
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as they identify the factors that lead to the outcome and what can be done to aid future 
occurrences. Many researchers have found that negative outcomes generate much more 
counterfactuals, especially upward counterfactuals (e.g., Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1997; 
Sanna & Turley, 1996). Haynes et al. (2007) predicted that UOs and COs might generate 
upward counterfactuals differentially, as this process involves considering hypothetical 
outcomes. As predicted, UOs generated more upward counterfactuals than COs for recent 
negative events. COs probably refrained from generating upward counterfactuals as doing so 
involves a self-appraisal process that would have evoked uncertainty and confusion about the 
self. In contrast, UOs had no problems dealing with such uncertainty, and therefore 
demonstrated their characteristic self-regulation style with generating more upward 
counterfactuals than their CO counterparts.  
The above findings have also been replicated in a more applied setting, specifically 
within a health context. In a study by Brouwers and Sorrentino (1993), it was found that UOs 
and COs sought different amounts of information as a function of response efficacy (and threat). 
UOs that read a pamphlet describing a highly threatening (i.e., high personal relevance, see later 
section), but easily self-diagnosable disease (i.e., high self-efficacy), made more requests for 
more information about the disease and asked to obtain the self-diagnosis test more often than 
COs. However, this pattern was reversed when the self-diagnosis test was unreliable and hard to 
use (i.e., low self-efficacy). In other words, COs made more requests for information and test 
kits than their UO counterparts. The authors suggest that in the high efficacy condition, UOs 
can easily make a self-diagnosis, in other words learn something new about themselves. In 
contrast, COs made more requests than UOs in the low efficacy condition because the test is not 
very reliable and hard to use. This offers the CO an opportunity to maintain their knowledge 
about themselves. These divergent uncertainty approach styles, not only lead to differences in 
regard to cognitions about the self, but it also leads to divergent cognitions when thinking about 
groups or within a group context.   
 
Uncertainty orientation and group-relevant cognitions. Hodson and Sorrentino (1997) was one 
of the first studies to demonstrate differences in functioning under a group context across UOs 
and COs. The authors believed that leadership style in a group, open vs. closed, would affect 
how UOs and COs functioned leading to differences in group processes and the decisions the 
group would arrive at. In an open-leadership style, the leader encourages expression of ideas, 
encourages voicing of divergent opinions, and facilitates voicing of opinions throughout the 
course of discussion (Janis, 1972). In contrast, closed-leaders tend to express their own opinion 
at the beginning of discussion, leading to the formation of group norms and expectation of 
conformity (Janis, 1972). Hodson and Sorrentino predicted that a closed-leadership style would 
create more certainty within the discussion context, while open-leaders encouraged new 
information, and thus uncertainty. Therefore, COs under the closed-leadership style would 
reach a biased decision (i.e., defer to the leader’s opinions) to a greater extent than UOs. As 
predicted, the authors found that COs did defer to the leader under the closed-leadership style, 
more than their UO peers. Specifically, under a closed leadership style, COs reached a biased 
decision 82% of the time in a mock trial paradigm, compared to 60% for UOs. The authors 
believed that COs aligned with the group norms created by closed-leaders’ expression of their 
opinions early. Additionally, the more certain environment created by these leaders’ less 
consideration of objectives and risks was also preferred by COs. In the open-leader condition, 
UOs, again, agreed with the leader’s decision about 60%. Perhaps UOs did not differ between 
conditions because they favored the leader’s decision to go to court (this was held constant) as it 
contained the most uncertainty. However, COs only deferred to the leader 39% of the time in 
this condition. Hodson and Sorrentino believed that COs were more hesitant in this condition 
because their leader did not express an opinion early in the discussion. Moreover, COs, in this 
condition, also exerted more pressure to members who did not agree with the group consensus. 
Szeto et al. 324 
In general, this study demonstrated that COs prefer to rely on the group for direction, like a 
heuristic device, when compared to their UO peers, especially for a leader that will create an 
environment of certainty and clarity.  
Continuing this theme, Sorrentino, Seligman, and Battista (2007) examined UOs and 
COs when need for assimilation and differentiation were aroused. Brewer’s (1991) optimal 
distinctiveness theory suggests that social identifications will be adjusted to match one’s 
currently aroused motivations. When one’s need for assimilation is aroused, the person then 
feels a need to belong and include into the in-group. In contrast, when one’s need for 
differentiation is aroused, then the person will feel a desire to feel unique and distinct form 
others. In support of this theory, Pickett, Silver, and Brewer (2002) found that when 
participants’ need for assimilation was aroused (by asking participants to write about times they 
were similar to others), they rated their in-groups as more important than when their need for 
differentiation was aroused. Despite these findings, Sorrentino and colleagues believed that 
UOs and COs should differ on their reactions to these motives when they are aroused. Citing 
Hodson and Sorrentino (1997, 2001) who found that COs are influenced by leadership style and 
favor in-groups more than UOs, these authors felt that COs would rate their in-groups as more 
important than UOs, when the need for assimilation was aroused. However, when the need for 
differentiation is aroused, UOs and COs should not differ as UOs and COs do not seem to vary 
on their need to be unique. As predicted, COs gave higher group importance ratings than their 
UOs, when their need for assimilation was aroused. COs also rated their values more similarly 
to their group peers than UOs. When the need for differentiation was aroused, COs and UOs did 
not differ on their ratings of either group importance or values. These above studies point out 
the importance of uncertainty orientation as an individual difference variable, especially within 
the context of cognitions. We will now explore how individual differences in uncertainty 
orientation interact with other variables to determine behaviors.     
 
The Theory of Uncertainty Orientation: The Interface of Cognition and Motivation 
Presently, we have described the prototypical individual differences in cognition that 
characterize UOs and COs. However, the theory of uncertainty orientation is more complex 
than just these individual differences. It also incorporates situational uncertainty, as well as 
personal relevance and affective motivations (e.g., achievement motivation) to predict 
information processing and performance outcomes (see Figure 1). The latest form of our theory 
(i.e., Sorrentino et al., 2003) also predicts emotional experience as a function of uncertainty 
orientation and situational uncertainty. 
 
Information processing. First and foremost, the theory of uncertainty orientation is a theory 
describing cognitive processes, specifically, information processing (e.g., Sorrentino, Bobocel, 
Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988). Alluded to previously, COs, when made to confront uncertainty 
(i.e., an uncertain situation), will engage in less effortful processing information, relying on 
heuristics. However, when COs are in a situation of certainty, in other words a match between 
uncertainty orientation and situational uncertainty, they become actively engaged by the 
situation and will process the information in a more careful and effortful manner. In contrast, 
the theory of uncertainty orientation posits the opposite for UOs. Specifically, when UOs are 
given an uncertain situation (i.e., a match between uncertainty orientation and situational 
uncertainty), they become actively engaged by the situation and will process information in a 
careful and effortful manner. When UOs are given a certain situation, rather than actively 
engaged, they become passively engaged and will process information with less effort, relying 
on heuristics over careful scrutiny of the information.  
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Figure 1.  The Uncertainty Orientation Framework. Adapted with permission from Sorrentino 
et al. (2003).  
 
Personal relevance. An important component of the uncertainty orientation framework was 
tested by Sorrentino et al. (1988). Specifically, these authors found that the type of processing 
one was engaged in is accentuated by the increasing personal relevance of the situation. This is 
contrary to dual processing theories of information processing that found personal relevance led 
to more effortful processing in all people, such as Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration 
likelihood model or Chaiken’s (1980) heuristic-systematic model. Expanding on a study 
conducted by Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981), Sorrentino et al. (1988) examined the 
effects of personal relevance on information processing in UOs and COs. After assessing 
uncertainty orientation, first-year undergraduate students read an argument for the 
implementation of comprehensive exams for graduating students in either 1-2 years (i.e., high 
personal relevance condition) or 5-10 years (i.e., low personal relevance condition). In their 
study, Petty et al. found a greater difference in attitude scores between those receiving strong 
and weak arguments for those in the high personal relevance condition than those in the low 
personal relevance condition. Presumably, low personal relevance led participants to scrutinize 
the arguments with less effort, leading to less discrimination between strong and weak 
arguments and resulting in less difference on attitude scores between the two conditions. In 
contrast, high personal relevance led participants to scrutinize the arguments more carefully, 
leading to greater discrimination between strong and weak arguments and resulting in a greater 
difference on attitude scores between strong and weak conditions. Sorrentino and colleagues 
(1988) did replicate this finding. However, this was only true for UOs. COs, on the other hand, 
evinced the opposite pattern. There was a greater difference between attitude scores in the 
strong and weak arguments when COs were in the low personal relevance condition than they 
were in the high personal relevance condition. Sorrentino and Roney (2000) suggest that careful 
and effortful evaluation of arguments requires careful consideration of the arguments, 
potentially leading to new knowledge about the self and environment and possibly uncertainty 
about the self. This is something that UOs would gladly engage in. However, COs might not be 
so keen because their characteristic uncertainty self-regulation style is to maintain clarity and 
certainty. COs would rather maintain clarity and certainty by not scrutinizing arguments 
carefully, offering less chance for confusion and uncertainty. Therefore, high personal relevance 
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should increase the current processing style of COs, in this case less effortful processing, 
leading to a smaller difference between strong and weak arguments than when personal 
relevance is low.  
 
The integration of motivation and cognition. The final component of the theory of uncertainty 
orientation deals with an individual’s affective motivations (e.g., achievement motivation). 
Sorrentino, Short, and Raynor (1984) believed that Atkinson’s (1964), along with Trope’s 
(1975) and Weiner’s (1970, 1972) analyses of task difficulty was incomplete. Atkinson argued 
that intermediate difficult tasks were the most motivating because easy tasks offer little value at 
success but difficult tasks offer little expectancy of success. In contrast, both Weiner and Trope 
believed that moderately difficult tasks were most engaging because these tasks were most 
diagnostic of one’s ability. Sorrentino and colleagues (1984) objected to both sets of 
interpretations. They believed that intermediate difficult tasks contained the most uncertainty in 
outcome, as opposed to very easy and very difficult tasks that were the most certain in 
outcomes (i.e., certainty of success or failure, respectively). To support their supposition, these 
authors conducted a study that demonstrated that individual differences in uncertainty 
orientation interacted more with achievement motivation and situation (i.e., task difficulty) to 
predict performance, rather than influenced just performance as a function of one’s achievement 
motivation and situation along. As stated previously, UOs are actively engaged by uncertainty 
and passively engaged by certainty, while COs are the opposite. Therefore, they predicted that 
UOs would be engaged by tasks of intermediate difficulty (i.e., probability of success of .5 
because they were most uncertainty of success or failure. Analogously, COs would be most 
engaged by tasks that were very easy (i.e., probability of success of .8) or very difficult (i.e., 
probability of success of .2), as they contained either a certainty of success or a certainty of 
failure. In such matched situations, active engagement leads one’s characteristic achievement-
related motives to be activated and expressed. Specifically, if one was success-oriented (SO) 
they would outperform those who were failure-threatened (FT). In situations where uncertainty 
orientation is mismatched with task difficulty, such as UOs given easy and difficult tasks or 
when COs are given task of intermediate difficulty, the individual is passively engaged, 
resulting in non-expressed achievement motives and no performance differences between SOs 
and FTs. The results demonstrated that in matched situations (i.e., UOs in the intermediate and 
COs in difficult or easy conditions), characteristic differences in achievement-related motives 
were engaged, leading to SOs correctly answering more questions than FTs on a complex 
arithmetic task. When participants were mismatched (i.e., COs in the intermediate and UOs in 
difficult or easy conditions), characteristic differences in achievement motivation were not 
engaged, leading to similar performances by SOs and FTs. With this study, achievement 
motivation was demonstrated to be subsumed by one’s uncertainty orientation. Therefore, 
performance outcomes were determined by the interaction of one’s uncertainty orientation with 
the situation and one’s achievement-related motive. In essence, uncertainty orientation can be 
considered the master motive in affecting an individual’s outcomes in this case, and one’s 
performance in achievement situations. 
 
Uncertainty orientation within the Japanese culture 
Thus far, we have discussed the basic cognitive and motivational components within the 
theory of uncertainty orientation and studies that have demonstrated support for its predictions. 
What about culture? Specifically, how does culture fit into the theory of uncertainty orientation? 
We do know that UOs and COs in Japan behave in the same way as they do in North America. 
Yasunaga and Kouhara (1995, in preparation) have conducted two studies in Japan that 
conceptually replicated findings in North American samples. In their partial replication of 
Sorrentino and Hewitt (1984), Yasunaga and Kouhara (1995) found that, UOs preferred to 
choose items on a personality test that were diagnostic of their abilities, whereas COs preferred 
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to choose items that were not diagnostic of their abilities. Analogously, these authors also 
conceptually replicated Brouwers and Sorrentino (1993) finding that UOs sought more 
information about a life-threatening disease when a cure was uncertain (Yasunaga & Kouhara, 
in prepartation). In contrast, COs sought more information when a cure was certain. With these 
findings, it was possible to examine the theory of uncertainty orientation across cultures, as the 
individual difference measure of uncertainty orientation was found valid in Japan. 
One of the first studies to investigate cross-cultural differences in uncertainty orientation 
was conducted by Shuper, Sorrentino, Otsubo, Hodson, and Walker (2004). They reasoned that 
because UOs have been found to be more self-oriented, preferring to resolve uncertainty about 
the self (e.g., Brouwers & Sorrentino, 1993; Brouwers, Sorrentino, Roney, & Hanna, 2004; 
Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984; Sorrentino et al., 1988), while COs are more group-oriented, 
preferring to defer to group norms and standards (e.g., Hodson & Sorrentino, 1997, 2001), 
uncertainty orientation might vary at the cultural level between East Asian and North American 
cultures due to the different values these cultures hold towards the self and the group. As 
predicted, Shuper and colleagues (2004) found that the Japanese sample was significantly more 
certainty-oriented than the Canadian sample. Moreover, chi-square analyses also showed that 
there was more COs than UOs in Japan, but vice versa in Canada. These results were 
subsequently replicated in two other studies (Sorrentino, Nezlek, Yasunaga, Kouhara, Otsubo & 
Shuper, 2008; Szeto, 2005) and further support the idea that Japanese culture is more certainty-
oriented than North American culture. Exploratory measures were also included in this study, 
examining unrealistic optimism, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance. These measures 
yielded very interesting results. Specifically, those who did not match their culture’s preferred 
way of uncertainty regulation (i.e., UOs in Japan and COs in Canada) reported higher levels of 
unrealistic optimism and uncertainty avoidance and lower levels of individualism. Shuper et al. 
(2004) suggest that the individualism and uncertainty avoidance scales probably tapped 
freedom and anxiety in the workplace, respectively. Therefore, these findings suggest, those 
who do not match their culture’s preferred way of handling uncertainty, are worse off than their 
matched counterparts, engaging in more self-enhancement and experiencing less freedom and 
more anxiety. 
In a second cross-cultural study in Japan, Sorrentino et al. (2008) found that affective 
outcomes varied as a function of uncertainty orientation and situational uncertainty 
(conceptualized at the cultural level), in accordance to the predictions of the theory of 
uncertainty orientation (Sorrentino et al., 2003). As discussed above, the type of information 
processing that one engages in, whether passive or active, is dependent on one’s uncertainty 
orientation and its match or mismatch with situational uncertainty. We propose that not only is 
the type of information process the result of the interaction between uncertainty orientation and 
situational uncertainty but one’s flow state can also be derived from this interaction (Sorrentino 
& Roney, 2000; Sorrentino et al., 2003; see also Kuhl, 1986). If there is a match between one’s 
uncertainty orientation, positive motivation (e.g., SO), and the situation, then one might be 
absorbed and enjoying the experience or task he/she is engaged in, not at all worried about 
his/her performance. Conversely, if one is in a matched situation but negatively motivated (i.e., 
FT), then he/she might be preoccupied by his/her performance, in a state of worry and anxiety. 
These two types of experience are termed flow and antiflow experiences, respectively. On the 
other hand, if there is a mismatch between one’s uncertainty orientation and the situation, one 
becomes disengaged from the task and situation, reacting in a passive manner. This is termed 
nonflow.  
We also propose that, in addition to these flow states, one experiences affect that is 
congruent with the state he/she is currently in. Russell (1980) distinguished affective 
experiences along a two-dimensional classification (i.e., activation and valence), resulting in 
four different types of emotions: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, passive-
negative. Those who are experiencing flow are actively engaged and positively motivated. This 
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should result in the experience of active-positive emotions (e.g., happy, excited) along Russell’s 
classification. Analogously, those experiencing antiflow are actively engaged and negatively 
motivated, resulting in experiences of active-negative emotions (e.g., anger, alarm). For those in 
a nonflow state, they are passively engaged and experience either passive-positive (e.g., calm, 
relaxed) or passive-negative emotions (e.g., depressed, bored), depending on their motivation.  
To test this hypothesis, Sorrentino et al. (2008) asked Japanese and Canadian 
participants to rate the extent they experience 20 different emotions (five for each of the four 
types) on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 “very little” to 7 “very much”. However, motivation 
was not examined because this was a study of general life experiences and not specific 
situations. Therefore, only hypotheses regarding emotions along the active-passive dimension 
were tested. Results indicated strong support for the theory of uncertainty orientation. Those 
whose uncertainty orientation was matched with their culture’s preferred way of handling 
uncertainty (i.e., Japanese COs and Canadian UOs) experienced more active emotions than their 
mismatched peers (i.e., Japanese UOs and Canadian COs). For matched participants, being in a 
situation (in this case culture) that is congruent with their uncertainty orientation seems to lead 
them to more daily experiences of active emotions. In contrast, mismatched participants seem to 
live constantly in a situation that is not in synchronization with their uncertainty self-regulation 
style and this seems to lead them to more passive activation, resulting in more experiences of 
passive emotions.2 The two cross-cultural studies discussed above point out the important role 
that culture plays in determining outcomes, especially in conjunction with uncertainty 
orientation. More importantly, these two studies demonstrate the psychological and emotional 
disadvantage that individuals face if their uncertainty orientation does not fit to their culture’s 
valued way of uncertainty self-regulation. 
 
Uncertainty Orientation in China: Children in a Changing Society 
Thus far, the cross-cultural research in uncertainty orientation described has been 
conducted solely in Japan. Do the findings from Japan generalize to other East Asian countries? 
Also, what about children? Most uncertainty orientation research has been conducted on adult 
university student samples. To address these two questions, we conducted an exploratory study 
comparing uncertainty orientation and adjustment outcomes in a sample of Chinese and 
Canadian children (Szeto, Ye, Sorrentino, Chen, Wang, & Jin, in preparation). Shuper et al. 
(2004) and Sorrentino et al. (2008) both demonstrated the disadvantage that mismatched 
participants face. We also speculated that children whose uncertainty orientation does not match 
their society’s way of handling uncertainty will be worse off than their matched peers in regard 
to performance in a school setting. With this said, we made no predictions regarding uncertainty 
orientation in the Chinese children. What we found was very interesting. First, regardless of 
culture, both Chinese and Canadian UO children were better adjusted than their CO peers. 
Overall, UOs had higher self-perceptions for their cognitive abilities, social competence, and 
global self-worth. Moreover, UOs also were rated by their teachers to be better academically in 
math and language, and to have less learning problems. Second, Chinese children, in general, 
were more uncertainty-oriented than Canadian children. This finding was also corroborated by a 
university sample (Study 2).  
Although we acknowledge that China and Japan are very distinct cultures, they both, 
however, espouse similar sets of values regarding interpersonal harmony and the group (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). If this is so, then what lead to these intriguing results? One 
possibility was suggested by Chen, Cen, Li, and He’s (2005) 12-year longitudinal research on 
                                                
2 In addition to experiencing more passive emotions, mismatched participants also experienced more 
negative and less positive emotions than their matched peers. Although this is not directly predicted from 
the theory of uncertainty orientation, the authors do speculate that living in an environment that does not 
value one’s preferred way of uncertainty regulation may lead to a cumulative build-up of negative 
experiences, resulting in more negative and less positive emotions.  
Uncertainty Orientation Within and Across Cultures                             329 
shyness in Chinese children. In 1990, shyness was associated with better adjustment, such as, 
higher peer acceptance, higher teacher-rated leadership and competence, and superior scholastic 
performance. However, in 1998, this relationship between shyness and adjustment ceased to 
exist in the Chinese children. Finally, in the 2002, the previous relationship between shyness 
and adjustment had reversed. Now, shyness was related to peer rejection and depression, along 
with lower teacher-rated competence. Chen and colleagues (2005) proposed that this change in 
the relationship between shyness and adjustment mirrors the changes that have undergone 
within the Chinese socioeconomic system, from a communist political-economic structure to a 
western open-market economy. Shyness within the old system was valued, as demonstrated by 
its association with superior adjustment. However, within the context of the new Chinese 
society, shyness might not fit so well. Assertiveness and emphasis on the self, rather than 
shyness, is probably more effective in navigating through a more open and competitive 
economic setting. Analogously, uncertainty orientation might have been affected in the same 
way. Certainty-orientation might have been more valued in the old system, but with the change 
in political-economic systems, parents might encourage their children to behave more like UOs, 
as this more self-oriented regulation style might be more conducive to the new societal structure. 
It would seem that uncertainty orientation might have been affected by China’s evolving social 
structure, much like shyness. However, this is only speculation. We did not assess uncertainty 
orientation over time nor across different cohorts. Therefore, more research is needed to 
ascertain the exact nature of this result. Nonetheless, this is an intriguing finding and affords 
some new insight into a dynamic society.  
       
Uncertainty Orientation, Culture, and the Future 
We feel that, in general, the theory of uncertainty orientation represents the conjunction 
of two psychological domains, namely social cognition and motivation, to form a complete and 
integrative description of individual behavior (see Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Rather than a 
limitation, culture offers new opportunities to expand and test our theory. Already, by 
incorporating culture within our research program and extant theoretical framework, many 
fruitful findings have surfaced. For example, a supportive finding for the theory of uncertainty 
orientation was conducted cross-culturally with a sample of Japanese and Canadian participants 
(i.e., Sorrentino et al., 2008). With this said, one of the most interesting and original aspects that 
is derived from cross-cultural uncertainty orientation research is our conceptualization of 
culture. Traditionally, culture is conceptualized more as a personality variable (e.g., Heine, 
Lehman, Markus & Kitayama, 1999; Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In 
Heine et al. (1999), culture’s ultimate effect on the individual is described as the formation of 
“relatively autonomous psychological structure[s]” in the mind of the individual (p. 768). In 
other words, by engaging in affect, cognitions, and behaviors that resonate with the culturally 
accepted way of thinking, feeling and behaving, they are repeated and maintained, forming 
stable psychological structures as time passes. Within this conceptualization of culture, cross-
cultural differences in affect, cognitions, or behaviors are a function of culture itself. For 
example, Kim and Markus (1999) examined differences in individuals’ choice of colored pens 
as a function of East Asians’ preference for majority rather than minority. It is interesting that 
East Asians chose pens that were the majority color, while Western participants chose pens that 
were the minority color. Although fruitful, these cross-cultural studies examining phenotypical 
differences have been well-documented.  
Within the theory of uncertainty orientation, culture is conceptualized as a situational 
variable. This conceptualization offers a unique way of examining culture, allowing one to 
explore the processes that underlie cognition and motivation within divergent cultural contexts. 
Treating culture as a personality variable, rather than a situational variable, leads to 
homogenization of individuals within a culture. In other words, if one lives in an East Asian 
culture, then he or she is typecast and ascribed a set of specific traits. The theory of uncertainty 
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orientation takes into account individual differences beyond those ascribed by one’s culture, 
accounting for individual motivations and cognitive styles. This allows our theory to make 
unique and novel predictions, where others do not. In Sorrentino et al. (2008), it was predicted 
and found that one’s uncertainty orientation would interact with culture to predict specific types 
of emotions one would experience. Although UOs and COs in Japan approach uncertainty in 
the characteristic styles as they do in Canada (Yasunaga & Kouhara, 1995, in preparation), they 
do not, however, experience the same types of emotions on a daily basis as their Canadian peers. 
Specifically, the Japanese have created a society that is structured in a way that is most 
conducive for COs. They have instituted cultural norms, values, and beliefs that provide a cloak 
of certainty and predictability.3 This is why Japanese COs experience more active emotions 
than passive emotions in Japan, while their peers in Canada actually experience more passive 
emotions than active ones. Of course, the cross-cultural research we have conducted so far is 
only the beginning. We have yet to examine the full tenants of our theory across cultures, such 
as the motivational component. Suffice it to say, the theory of uncertainty orientation offers a 
new and exciting vantage point for exploring culture, within an integrated framework of 
motivation and cognition.        
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